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This paper tests the impact of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WRA) by looking at 
changes in the behaviour of a panel of workplaces in the Illawarra Region of NSW 
between 1996 and 2004. The results support the proposition that the major impact 
has been on the level of unionisation and union density in these workplaces. There 
was virtually no expansion in the use of enterprise bargaining or AWAs, although 
there was a small but significant increase in non-union agreement making. Rather 
than encourage the use of single jurisdictions to register awards and collective 
agreements, in the Illawarra at least, there was a strong trend to dual State and 
Federal jurisdictions. Thus the WRA has been relatively ineffective in achieving 
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Introduction 
 
The Commonwealth Workplace Relations Act 1996, introduced by the incoming 
Liberal/National Party Coalition Government, became effective in 1997.  Originally 
expected to involve a substantial shift in Australian industrial relations, Senate 
amendments greatly reduced the more radical elements in the new Act.  Further 
attempts in 2000 and 2001 to amend the Act were also defeated in the Senate.   
Consequently, the industrial relations environment between 1997 and 2005 has only 
been a partial reflection of the directions intended by the Howard Coalition 
Government. 
 
Perhaps because of this, there has been some debate as to the exact purpose of this 
Act.  Vernon Winley from the Business Council of Australia writing in the Australian 
Bulletin of Labour (1997:82) saw it as a means of providing a more enterprise-
focused approach to employee relations that would allow Australian businesses to 
respond more effectively to international competition, that is to foster increased and 
more innovative uses of enterprise bargaining.  As well as this decentralisation of 
employee relations, it was to introduce decollectivisation in the form of individual 
contracts or Australian Workplace Agreements.  Thirdly, it was hoped that it would 
enable workplaces to avoid the costs of operating in duplicate systems by moving 
entirely into either State or the Federal jurisdiction. 
 
Others, such as Lee and Peetz (1998:5), had a more critical view, arguing that “the 
objective of the Act may be to provide a framework for cooperative workplace 
relations, but the purpose is to weaken unions ….”  Deery and Mitchell (1999), 
quoted in Riley (2003:151), reiterated this position arguing that the agenda since 1997 
can be described as “individualism and union exclusion”. 
 
It is now some eight years since the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) became 
operative and the Coalition Government, now with control of the Senate, is at last in a 
position to introduce its preferred framework for industrial relations in Australia.   
New initiatives involving overriding State legislation to enforce a single Federal 
system, expand the use of individual agreements, and reduce the number of allowable 
conditions under awards have been mooted under its WorkChoices proposals.  This is 
thus an opportune time to examine the extent to which competing objectives of the 
original Act have been achieved before the environment is affected by new 
amendments.  As no full-scale industrial relations survey has been conducted since 
the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in 1995 (AWIRS95), a full 
testing of its impact is not possible. 
 
However, in conjunction with AWIRS95, a regional study was conducted in the 
Illawarra region of NSW, the Illawarra Regional Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey or IRWIRS96.  A small scale follow-up of that study was undertaken in 2004, 
which duplicated some of the original questions. Using that data, and particularly 
results from a subset of those firms that were included in both the 1996 and 2004 
samples, some indications of the impact of the WRA can be made in terms of the 
spread of enterprise bargaining, use of non-union and individual bargaining, union 
density and jurisdictional choice.  The results of that panel study are presented below. 
 
   2
Changes in  National and Regional Industrial Relations Environment, 1996 -2004 
 
Two main features of the industrial relations environment require consideration: the 
regulatory environment created through legislation, and the economic environment. 
These are considered in turn below. 
 
The WRA provided a framework that could facilitate a shift of industrial power 
towards employers, by encouraging more direct negotiation between employees and 
employers, bypassing union intermediaries. The main features of the WRA included: 
 
•  significant limitation of the matters about which the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission may make awards to twenty ‘allowable matters’ under 
normal circumstances; 
•  certified agreements of a collective nature may be between a business or 
corporation and a union (S170LJ), or a non-union agreement between a 
corporation and its employees (170LK); 
•  introduction of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) between 
individual employers and individual employees; 
•  lodgement of AWAs with the new Employment Advocate; 
•  no longer is there a need to be a federal award respondent to access any of the 
above agreements or otherwise participate in the Act ; 
•  exclusion of unions from the processes of AWA ratification; 
•  provision for registration of enterprise unions; 
•  some increased restrictions on right of entry of union officials to workplaces;  
•  introduction of protected industrial action by employers or employees during 
bargaining periods, whilst introducing penalties for ‘unprotected’ action during 
the period of agreements;  
•  strengthening of provisions against secondary boycotts; and 
•  abolition of the Australian Industrial Court. 
 
These aspects of the WRA have been responsible for, or at least complemented, a 
major restructuring of the industrial relations system in Australia. Almost 40 per cent 
of the workforce now have their wages and conditions determined principally by 
collective enterprise agreements, with awards providing a minimum set of standards, 
which are the basis for the ‘no disadvantage test’ applied by the AIRC for certifying 
collective agreements.  Awards also provide a ‘social safety net’ more broadly, as the 
sole basis of wages and conditions for about a fifth of the workforce, principally the 
low-paid and non-unionised (Watts and Mitchell 2004). On this basis, the ACTU 
periodically submits applications to the AIRC for increases in award minimum wages. 
AWAs have been vigorously promoted by the federal government and Employment 
Advocate. In some cases they have been used by employers as a means of 
undercutting union collective agreements, but they have only been taken up by 
employers employing 2 per cent of the workforce, with about 38 per cent of the 
workforce covered by unregistered individual agreements (ABS 2002; Sheldon and 
Thornthwaite 2001; Watts and Mitchell 2004). In terms of industrial relations 
processes, there has been a growth in litigation of disputes through ordinary courts 
(Frazer 1997, 1998 and 1999; Catanzariti and Shariff 2001 and 2002; Catanzariti, 
Shariff and Brown 2003; Sheldon and Thornthwaite 2001), and a rapid increase in 
employers’ use of the lockout (Briggs 2004; Sheldon and Thornthwaite 2001, 2002).   3
 
The industrial relations actors also have been affected significantly by the WRA. 
Trade union membership, which accounted for over 50 per cent of the workforce in 
the mid 1970s and still 40 per cent in the early 1990s (Sadler and Fagan 2004), has 
continued to decline since 1996, to 23 per cent of the Australian workforce in 2004, 
and only 18 per cent of the private sector workforce (ABS 2004). Although this 
decline has been the result of a number of structural factors, David Peetz has 
demonstrated that the restrictions imposed by the WRA have contributed significantly 
to the continuing decline of union membership post-1996 (Peetz 1998). Recent 
statistics for membership of employer associations are less readily available. 
However, employer association membership fell between 1990 and 1995, particularly 
in the private sector, from 82 to 74 per cent of workplaces, according to AWIRS 
(Morehead et al. 1997: 89). Membership might be expected to have declined further 
because of the new regime of enterprise bargaining. In Britain after industrial 
relations reform during the 1980s encouraged a shift from industry level to enterprise 
bargaining, employer associations have ‘suffered widespread decline’ (Sheldon and 
Thornthwaite 1999: 213). In New Zealand after the 1991 Employment Contracts Act 
largely eliminated multi-employer bargaining, industry-based associations virtually 
disappeared. In Australia it seems that employer associations have declined since 
1996, and that there is greater competition amongst them for employer support. At 
least some Australian organisations, such as the Association of Employers of 
Waterfront Labour, have disappeared altogether.  There also is evidence that the role 
of employer associations, and the services they provide members, have changed since 
1996. For example, many associations now offer enterprise bargaining support and a 
greater range of technical services to their members, often on a fee for service basis 
(Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 73, 201, 218; Bell 1994). 
 
At the same time, the NSW industrial relations legislation moved in the opposite 
direction to the federal WRA, in confirming the roles of awards, the NSW Industrial 
Relations Commission and unions. The NSW system, which retains significant 
coverage in that State, does not restrict industrial action in the way that the WRA 
does, and has no equivalent of AWAs. It might be expected that unions would favour 
remaining in the State system, whereas some employers would favour the WRA. This 
may impact upon the distribution of State and federal award and agreement coverage 
in the Illawarra. 
 
The other major determinant of the industrial relations environment is the state of the 
economy, and particularly the labour market. At a national level the economic 
environment has not changed significantly since AWIRS95. Growth in national GDP 
slowed marginally while employment increased.  However, there was a significant 
fall in interest rates whilst inflation and unemployment rates declined
1.  Generally this 
indicated a buoyant economy. At the regional level, the Illawarra economy was 
performing poorly compared to national conditions in 1996/7, when IRWIRS96 was 
conducted, with falling trade conditions for many firms, stagnation in key sectors, and 
declining employment and consumer spending. The rate of unemployment was 
significantly higher in the Illawarra, at 13.5 per cent (Markey et al. 2001: 11-12). 
                                                 
1 Annual growth in real GDP slowed from 4.1% in 1994-95 to 3.6% in 2003-4.  Unemployment fell to 
5.8%, the lowest since 1976-77.  The CPI increased by 3.2% in 1994-95 and 2.4% in 2003-04 
(Treasury 2004(a), 2004(b)).  Interest rates (90 day bill rate) declined from over seven percent in 1995 
to just under five and half percent by the end of 2004 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2005).   4
Since 1997, the regional economy has become far more buoyant and unemployment 
has declined, to 6.4 per cent in the Wollongong Local Government Area (LGA) in 
March 2002. However, unemployment rose again, to 9.1 per cent in Wollongong, 8.6 
per cent in Shellharbour, and 8.8 per cent in Shoalhaven LGAs in March 2004. 
Unemployment remains higher than the national average of 6.6 per cent, and for NSW 
at 6.0 per cent (IRIS Research 2004: 7-8).  
 
Improvements in economic conditions at the national and regional level might be 
expected to lead to increased industrial action.  However, as shown above, there has 
been steady economic growth over the past ten years without any major disruptions to 
the downward trend in industrial activity indicators.  Thus, with strike indicators such 
as working days lost at historically low levels, it is clear that changes in the regulatory 
environment, as briefly outlined above, are more likely to produce the greatest 
impacts upon the pattern of industrial relations in the current era (Hodgkinson and 





In order to identify elements of regional industrial relations change, a survey of 
Illawarra workplaces was conducted in May/June 2004, IRWIRS 2004, to compare 
with the earlier IRWIRS96.  A range of questions were selected that could identify the 
impact of the regulatory system upon the nature of the industrial relations system and 
the state of the parties to it. The survey data sought for comparison between 1996 and 
2004 related to the following issues: 
•  employer association membership and types of services used; 
•  trade union membership, number of unions, and delegate presence; 
•  incidence of direct forms of employee participation (such as teamwork and 
quality circles); 
•  incidence of indirect or representative forms of employee participation other 
than unions; 
•  payment systems, including incidence of awards, certified enterprise 
agreements, AWAs, and informal agreements; 
•  workforce reductions; and 
•  industrial action. 
 
The 2004 questionnaire was directed towards employee relations managers, as with 
the main component of IRWIRS96, and the specific questions concerning the issues 
listed above were identical between the two surveys. However, the 2004 survey was 
shorter than IRWIRS96, and unlike the original survey the 2004 version was 
conducted by telephone rather than face-to-face interview.  An initial comparison of 
the results from the two surveys was developed (Hodgkinson and Markey 2005). 
 
The 2004 survey covered 212 workplaces drawn from the same population as the 
1996 survey, which covered 194 workplaces representing 25 per cent of all 
workplaces in the region with 20 or more employees.  The 2004 workplaces employed 
just under 20,000 people, with an average employment size of 92.  Firms in the 
database from which the sample was drawn all employed 20 or more employees in 
1996.  However, some of the firms had downsized or restructured into separate units 
in the intervening eight years, such that 17 per cent are now classified as small (less   5
than 20 employees). In addition, the 2004 sample had a higher proportion of 
manufacturing firms than the 1996 sample. As a consequence, the 2004 sample 
contained more of the larger firms than in 1996.  
 
These differences in the structures of the two samples raised some concerns that the 
reported changes in behaviour in the initial comparison might be due to sample 
characteristics rather than true responses to the elements of the Workplace Relations 
Act. Consequently, a panel data set of 89 firms was extracted from the two surveys 
comprising firms which were included in both surveys. A similar analysis of changes 
in behaviour since the introduction of this Act was conducted. In this case we can be 
confident that we are recording true changes, rather than structural sample 
differences. However, the behaviour changes shown by the panel dataset were in most 
cases similar to those found between the two whole samples, confirming the results 
originally presented.  The only significant difference was that the firms in the panel 
dataset had a higher proportion of union presence in 2004, and a higher proportion of 
workplaces with union delegates in both 1996 and 2004, than the full sample dataset.  
The 1996 and 2004 mean results from the panel data set and the full samples for all 





Based on the foregoing discussion of the intentions of the Workplace Relations Act 
1996, a number of hypotheses regarding expected firm behaviour have been 
developed.  These are tested using statistical tests including a test of significant 
differences in proportions for matched variables, prior to and after the introduction of 
the WRA (two related samples McNemar Test or Matched samples T-test), and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov z – test or the Mann-Whitney test, which tests whether the 
panel dataset has similar characteristics to the full sample database.  These results are 
presented in Table 1 and discussed below. 
 
Hypothesis 1: That the use of awards declined after the introduction of the WRA. 
 
As noted in Appendix A, the proportion of panel firms with awards was 96.6 per cent 
in 1996 and 95.7 per cent in 2004.  In the sample as a whole, the proportion fell from 
98 per cent to 94 per cent over the same time period.  As shown in Table 1, there has 
been no significant decline in the number of panel workplaces with awards since the 
introduction of the WRA.  Further, the z-test indicates that this result is typical of the 
sample as a whole.  Awards remained the basis of the industrial relations system in 
the Illawarra under the WRA. 
 
Hypothesis 2: That there has been a growth in the use of (a) certified collective 
enterprise agreements, and (b) non-certified enterprise agreements since the 
introduction of the WRA. 
 
Both these hypotheses can be rejected.  There has been no increase in the proportion 
of workplaces with collective enterprise agreements since the WRA.  The percentage 
of workplaces with certified enterprise agreements in the panel dataset fell slightly 
from 43.8 per cent to 43.0 per cent.  Thus it appears that by 1996, those firms which 
wanted enterprise agreements had already established them under the provisions of   6
the earlier Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993.  The changes to encourage 
enterprise bargaining in the WRA had no impact on the decision of firms to move to 
these agreements.  Further, there was only a marginal increase in the proportion of 
workplaces in the panel dataset with non-certified collective agreements from 24 per 
cent to 26 percent.  Neither of these changes was statistically significant, indicating 
that the WRA had no impact on the decision to move to enterprise agreements as a 
means of determining wages and conditions.  The z – test results indicate that this was 
true of the sample as a whole.  However, the average number of certified agreements 
in these workplaces rose from 2.9 to 5.7, although the high variability in the data 
indicated that this change was not significant.   
 
The WRA encouraged firms to bargain directly with their employers, rather than 
through a union (Buchanan et al. 1998). There was some evidence that this strategy 
had been successful. In 1996, there was a significant difference between having a 
certified enterprise agreement if there was a union in the workplace (37% of all firms) 
and having one if there was no union (7% of all firms). By 2004, there was no 
significant difference with the proportion of unionised workplaces with enterprise 
agreements dropping to 29 per cent and the proportion of non-union workplaces with 
enterprise agreements rising to 14 per cent. There was no significant difference 
between having a non-certified collective agreement or not by union status of the 
workplace in either year. Thus there is some indication that workplaces using 
enterprise agreements have increased their usage under the WRA, and also that some 
non-union negotiated enterprise agreements are in place, although the proportion of 
workplaces where this is occurring is not high. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Increased use of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). 
 
AWAs were intended to be the main mechanism within the WRA to achieve non-
union agreements (Rimmer 1997). This hypothesis cannot be tested statistically as 
there were no provisions for individual registered agreements prior to the WRA.   
However, only 1.1 per cent of workplaces in the panel dataset had AWAs in 2004.  
This is below the national average of 2 per cent (ABS 2002). Thus this proposition 
can be rejected, in that eight years after the operation of the WRA, little use was being 
made of AWAs in the Illawarra.  The z – test results indicate that this finding was true 
of the sample as a whole. 
 
Hypothesis 4: That there has been a decline in (a) number of unionised workplaces
2 
and in (b) union density. 
 
It has been argued that the real purpose of the WRA was to weaken unions through a 
range of provisions that lessened their powers to operate and affect their financial 
viability (Lee and Peetz 1998).  However, another perspective is that the decline in 
membership is a response to members’ dissatisfaction with the performance of unions 
(Costa 1997).  Whatever the reason, the decline in union membership within the 
Australian workforce has been repeated in the Illawarra. Thus, both these hypotheses 
are accepted.   
 
                                                 
2 Defined as in AWIRS95 as workplaces with at least one union member.   7
There was a decline in union density in the workforces of firms in the panel dataset 
from 66 per cent in 1996 to 43 per cent in 2004, compared with a decline to 39 per 
cent for the total sample.  Average employment in these firms remained relatively 
constant at 91-92 employees.  However, the average number of unionists fell from 84 
to 39 in these workplaces.  This decline in union density, which reflects the trend 
throughout the Australian workforce, was associated with a decline in the proportion 
of unionised workplaces from 74 per cent in 1996 to 61 per cent in 2004.  Moreover, 
an even larger decline occurred in the sample as a whole from 74 per cent in 1996 to 
51 per cent in 2004.  The average number of unions per workplace fell from 2.3 to 1.9 
over the same period.  These differences indicate that the panel dataset firms were 
significantly different from the others in the sample, containing a higher proportion of 
union workplaces and members.  The relevance of this finding is discussed below. 
 
Further analysis of this fall in union density demonstrates that the majority of the 
decline in union membership occurred in the private sector.  Average union 
membership fell from 49 to 30 per cent in private workplaces, and from 65 to 53 per 
cent in public workplaces.  There was no significant change in the proportion of union 
members in mining and manufacturing workplaces, although it did fall from 51 to 43 
per cent.  The fall in public service workplaces from 62 to 48 per cent was also not 
significant.  However, there was a highly significant drop in union density in private 
sector service industry workplaces from 50 per cent in 1996 to 29 per cent in 2004. 
 
Hypothesis 5: That there has been a decline in union delegate presence and in the 
number of delegates in workplaces. 
  
The proportion of workplaces with a union delegate presence decreased very 
marginally from 53 per cent to 52 per cent in the panel dataset firms.  For the samples 
as a whole, it dropped from 47 per cent to 39 per cent of workplaces.  However, the 
average number of delegates in workplaces that did have delegates rose from 2.5 in 
1996 to 3.3 in 2004, although this change was not statistically significant.  Thus this 
hypothesis is rejected. The incidence of union delegates in workplaces remained 
generally stable in the panel dataset between 1996 and 2004. However, the z – test 
results indicate that this finding was not true of the full survey database. There the 
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Table 1: Results of Hypotheses Tests 
 
Hypothesis  Panel Data only (p value
1 
 And Outcome) 
Test of Independence 
between Panel and Rest 
of sample
2 and Outcome 





No difference in results 





No difference in results 






No difference in results 





No difference in results 
4(a). Decline in 





Panel results different 
4 (b). Decline in union 
density 
.000***  [see note 1] 
Supported 
.001*** [see note 2] 
Panel results different 





Panel results different 
5(b) decline in number of 
delegates 
.795 [see note 1]  
Not supported 
.120 [see note 2] 
No difference in results 
6. Decline in industrial 




No difference in results 





No difference in results 
8. Decline in membership 




No difference in results 





No difference in results 





No difference in results 
9(c). Increase of awards 




No difference in results 
9(d). Decline in 
agreements in State 
jurisdiction 
.084   
Not supported [wrong sign, 
agreements in State 
jurisdiction increased] 
.824  
No difference in results 
9(e). Iincrease in 
agreements in Federal 
jurisdiction 
.006**   
Not supported [wrong sign, 
agreements in Federal 
jurisdiction decreased] 
.781  
No difference in results  
9(f). Increase in 





No difference in results 
1  Significance measured by McNemar test due to qualitative (binary) data. 
2 Significance measured by Two Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov z-test 
Note 1: Significance measured by Matched Samples T-test method as quantitative data available. 
Note 2: Independence of samples measured by Mann-Whitney test as quantitative data available. 
*** Significant at 99 per cent confidence level 
**   Significant at 95 per cent confidence level   9
 
This observation generates a further hypothesis that union presence did not decline in 
workplaces which had delegates in 1996.  This hypothesis can be accepted, with a 
highly significant relationship between having a delegate in the workplace in 1996 
and still having a trade union in that workplace in 2004.  Of those workplaces that did 
have a trade union in 1996, 86 per cent that also had delegates in 1996 still had a trade 
union in 2004.  Of workplaces which had a union in 1996 but no delegate, only 59 per 
cent still had a union, while 41 per cent no longer had a union.  Thus the decline in 
union presence in the firms in the panel dataset is clearly more prevalent in 
workplaces with no delegate structure in place.  This result clearly supports the 
‘organising strategy’ approach of the trade union movement to the pressures against 
unionism in the WRA (ACTU 2003) and confirms previously recognised patterns 
(Peetz 1998:48-9, 115-16) 
 
Hypothesis 6: That there has been a decline in industrial action. 
 
This hypothesis is accepted.  The proportion of workplaces in the panel dataset that 
had industrial action in the twelve months prior to each survey fell from 27 per cent in 
1996 to 19 per cent in 2004.  For the complete survey database, the decline was very 
similar being from 26 per cent to 17 per cent.  As shown in Appendix A, declines 
occurred in strikes, stop-work meetings and picketing.  However, there was an 
increased incidence of over-time bans, work-to-rule and go-slow actions.  The decline 
in industrial disputes would appear to reflect the influence of the provisions in the 
WRA constraining standard strike action to ‘protected periods’ during enterprise 
bargaining, although even work-to-rule and go-slow actions are covered by the 
general constraints on industrial action under the WRA. Their increase may reflect the 
influence of the State jurisdiction, discussed below, since there are fewer restraints on 
industrial action in the State jurisdiction.  An analysis of types of industrial action by 
whether or not the workplace had a certified enterprise agreement, did not show 
significant differences in the incidence of each type of industrial action.  This 
indicates that industrial action can occur regardless of the type of payments system in 
place.  A further analysis did find significant relationships between all forms of 
industrial action except ‘go-slows’ with whether the workplace was unionised or not.  
No industrial action occurred in any non-unionised workplace in the 2004 panel 
dataset firms. 
 
Hypothesis 7: That there was an increased use of ‘lock-outs’. 
 
The WRA allowed firms to lock-out workers during protected bargaining periods, as 
well as permitting strike action.  However, no lock-outs occurred in the panel dataset 
workplaces in the twelve months before the 2004 survey, nor were any recorded in the 
1996 survey. Thus this hypothesis is rejected indicating that lock-outs are not a 
normally negotiating mechanism in the Illawarra. The z–test indicates that this finding 
was also true of the full survey database. Nevertheless, they have been used in the 
past, the Joy Manufacturing case being a celebrated early use of this device in the 




   10
 
Hypothesis 8: That membership of employer associations declined. 
 
This hypothesis is accepted. The proportion of workplaces that were members of 
employer associations was 76 per cent in 1996, and this dropped to 59 per cent by 
2004. For the sample as a whole, membership dropped from 73 per cent to 59 per cent 
in these years. This drop in membership was statistically significant. The drop in 
membership does not seem to be associated with trade union presence in the 
workplace. In 1996 firms were significantly more likely to be a member of an 
employer association if there was no union in their workplace. In 2004 no significant 
relationship existed between the two. The z–test result indicates that the drop in 
employer association membership was also found in the sample as a whole. 
 
As shown in Appendix A, the only employer association service to experience a 
relative drop in usage was advice on awards and agreements, although this change 
was not statistically significant. Usage of other services increased. Those where there 
was a significant change were: advice when management negotiating with unions; 
representation when negotiating with unions; representation at industrial tribunals; 
advice on EEO/AA issues; advice on OH&S issues; and legal advice. This indicates 
that employer association services are being used relatively more often for complex 
union negotiations and regulated matters.  
 
Hypothesis 9: That there has been a movement towards Federal jurisdiction for 
awards and collective agreements. 
 
The introduction of enterprise bargaining, which was argued in terms of the need to 
provide flexibility to meet the pressures of global competition, was associated with an 
increase in the role of federal bargaining structures. This role was strengthened with 
the introduction of individual bargaining structures in the WRA (Sadler and Fagan 
2004, Winley 1997). Given this strengthening of the role of federal institutions over 
time, a shift from state to federal jurisdiction for both awards and collective 
agreements could be expected.  There was a drop from 1996 to 2004 in the proportion 
of workplaces that only had State awards from 60 per cent to 54 per cent in the panel 
dataset firms. The corresponding drop for the samples as a whole was from 63 per 
cent to 51 per cent. This change was statistically significant.  There was no change in 
the proportion of panel dataset firms having awards only in the federal jurisdiction.  
The proportion of workplaces with only federal awards in the samples as a whole 
declined from 22 per cent in 1996 to 15 per cent in 2004. However, there was a 
significant increase in the proportion of firms in the panel dataset with awards in both 
jurisdictions, rising from 17 per cent in 1996 to 27 per cent in 2004.  The 
corresponding movement in the samples as a whole was from 13 per cent to 35 per 
cent over these years. Thus, while the state jurisdiction remained the dominant area 
for registration of awards, a movement to also register awards in the federal 
jurisdiction can be seen, indicating that the WRA has had an influence in this area, 
and the hypothesis can be accepted. 
 
However, there was an increase in the proportion of firms which had their certified 
collective agreements only registered in the State jurisdiction, rising from 36 per cent 
in 1996 to 58 per cent in 2004. This change was statistically significant. There was 
also a substantial drop in the proportion of firms who had their certified agreements   11
only registered in the federal jurisdiction, from 46 per cent to 18 per cent in 2004.  
Again, this change was statistically significant. The proportion of firms which had 
agreements registered in both jurisdictions rose from 18 per cent to 25 per cent.   
However, this change was not statistically significant. All these results are applicable 
to both sets of firms. Thus, not only has the WRA not been associated with a change 
of jurisdiction in the registration of agreements towards the federal system, but there 
has actually been a significant movement away from the federal jurisdiction to the 
NSW State system. Thus this hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 10: That there has been an increase in the use of direct participation 
methods (team building, semi-autonomous work groups, total quality management 
and quality circles) but no increase in the use of indirect participation methods (JCCs, 
taskforces and ad hoc committees). 
 
Direct involvement or participation entails the employee in job or task-orientated 
decision making in the production process or other business activities. These 
techniques have been associated with increased flexibility and organisational 
efficiency, and consequently they have become popular in recent years (Markey 
2001).  Teamwork is the most rudimentary form of direct participation.  Semi or fully 
autonomous work groups refer to the degree of decision-making undertaken by teams, 
and total quality management (TQM) refers to workplaces organised entirely on a 
team basis. Quality circles are problem-solving groups. IRWIRS96 found that the 
incidence of these techniques was similar to Australia generally, except that semi or 
fully autonomous work groups were less common in the Illawarra, and TQM and 
quality circles were a little more common than for Australia as a whole (Markey et al. 
2001: 211-12; Morehead et al. 1997: 187-90).  
 
Indirect involvement relates to mechanisms where employees participate in decision 
making through elected or appointed representatives on committees or boards.   
Generally, consultative committees do not bargain over wages, but may have 
jurisdiction over a wide range of conditions. Committees tend to be more common in 
public sector workplaces, those that are unionised, larger workplaces and those in the                      
manufacturing, transport and storage and education sectors (Markey et al. 2001: 215).  
 
As shown in Appendix A, there was increased use of all direct participation methods 
in the panel dataset firms.  This was paralleled by similar increases in all methods in 
the samples as a whole between 1996 and 2004. These changes were strongly 
significant for team building, semi-autonomous working groups and quality circles.  
The change was not significant for Total Quality Management.  However, again as 
shown in Appendix A, the use of indirect participation methods also increased over 
the 1996 – 2004 time period.  These changes were equally as significant as those 
occurring in the direct methods.  These results are shown in Table 2.  Thus while there 
has been an increased usage of participation methods in the Illawarra, there is no 
evidence of a movement towards direct methods away from indirect methods, which 
are more often associated with union participation (Markey et al. 2001:215).  Further, 
the z – test results indicate that these findings are also applicable to the full survey 
database firms. 
 
   12
Table 2: Changes in Use of Direct and Indirect Participation Methods in 
Illawarra 
 
Hypothesis 10  Panel Data only (p value
1 
And Outcome) 
Test of Independence 
between Panel and Rest 
of sample
2 and Outcome 
Direct Participation 
Methods 











No difference in results 
Use of Semi-autonomous 




No difference in results 





No difference in results 





No difference in results 
Indirect Participation 
Methods 
No significant increase in 









No difference in results 
 
No significant increase in 





No difference in results 
 
 1  Significance measured by McNemar Test  
 2  Significance measured by two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov z–test. 
*** Significant at 99 per cent confidence level 
**   Significant at 95 per cent confidence level  
 
Broader Application of Panel Results 
 
The results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov z–tests indicate that the panel dataset 
firms only differed from the rest of the sample in one particular set of characteristics.  
They had a higher proportion of workplaces with a union presence, higher union 
density and higher union delegate presence in their workplaces than the rest of the 
sample.  This stronger union presence may have eventuated from the situation where 
the panel firms are possibly older than those in the full sample, having all been in 
existence in 1996.  As such, they may be more representative of the ‘old’ industrial 
environment of the Illawarra (Markey et al. 2001:9). 
 
This stronger union presence in the panel dataset could result in these firms being less 
able to move in the ways intended by the WRA due to organised workforce 
resistance.  Thus, for example, the increase in enterprise agreements registered in the 
State jurisdiction, and the decline in registration in the federal jurisdiction may be the 
result of union power forcing employers to agree to move into a judicial system that is 
considered to be more supportive of union negotiations. The low take-up of AWAs 
could be similarly explained.  However, the z – test results indicate that these findings 
are common for the rest of the sample database firms, which have lower union 
presence, lower union density and lower delegate presence in their workplaces.  Thus   13
the choice of State jurisdiction for the registration of enterprise agreements does not 
seem to be influenced by union presence in the workplace.  This result is confirmed 
through cross-tabulation analysis.  For both the panel dataset and the full survey 
database firms, there was no significant difference on whether firms used only the 
state jurisdiction for enterprise agreements as to whether they had a trade union or 
not.  Indeed, those firms with no union in both sets had a higher propensity to use 
only the State system, while those with unions had a slightly higher use of either the 
federal only or registration in both systems.
3 
 
Overall, it has been demonstrated that the trends shown in the panel dataset firms are 
typical of those of the 2004 survey firms as a whole, and by inference, of the 
population of Illawarra medium and large sized firms as a whole.  The question of 
whether the Illawarra findings can be extended to the rest of New South Wales and 
Australia can only be speculated upon, as no comparable database of post-AWIRS 
behaviours are available for these larger geographic areas.  Markey et al. (2001:394-
397) concluded that the Illawarra had a distinctive regional industrial relations 
environment in 1996.  However, Hodgkinson and Markey (2005) argued, based on a 
comparison of the full 2004 survey database outcomes with those of IRWIRS96 and 
AWIRS95, that much of this distinctiveness had now diminished.  If this is the case, 
then these results at least provide some indications of how state and national 





The results from this study tend to support the hypothesis that the main impact of the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 to date has been on union presence and density rather 
than on any change in the payments systems towards either enterprise bargaining or 
individual contracts or a movement to single jurisdictions for the registration of 
awards or agreements. 
 
Substantial declines in the proportion of unionised workplaces and union workforce 
density were recorded in the Illawarra, which parallels declines in the rest of 
Australia.  This occurred even though the Illawarra can be considered a traditional 
industrial region and hence a stronghold for union activity.  Much of this decline 
occurred in private service sector workplaces.  Encouragingly for unions perhaps, the 
results support their ‘organising strategy’ approach with workplaces that had a 
delegate presence in 1996 much less likely to lose their union presence than those that 
did not.  There was some indication that the protected action restrictions of the WRA 
had affected the type of industrial actions that were occurring with a move to less 
overt methods. 
 
There was no significant move towards enterprise bargaining and away from Award 
based systems to determine pay and conditions with the operation of the WRA.  This 
suggests that if the intention of further reducing the number of issues that can be 
                                                 
3 Of workplaces with agreements, for the panel dataset, 69% of firms with no trade union registered 
agreements only in the NSW State system, while for those with a trade union 52% registered 
agreements only in the State system.  For the rest of the survey firms, 57% of firms with no trade union 
registered agreements only in the NSW State system, while for those with a trade union 52% registered 
agreements only in the State system.   14
covered by awards is introduced, a large proportion of workers in the Illawarra now 
predominantly reliant on awards to determine working conditions would be 
significantly more vulnerable than under the current regime.  In 2004, significantly 
more workplaces, whether with agreements or not, made overaward payments than in 
1996.  This reflected the more buoyant economic and workforce conditions operating 
in the second survey period.  There was only a small increase in the use of non-union 
agreements and virtually no uptake of AWAs.  Thus, if the intention of the 1996 Act 
was to encourage enterprise or individual bargaining, it was ineffective in this 
objective.  These results could be used either to argue that there was no need to 
introduce such provisions beyond those already incorporated in the previous Labor 
Government’s Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, or alternatively that they 
demonstrate the need to strengthen the WRA as proposed in the 2000-2001 
Amendments and in the current Government proposals. 
 
Finally, the results show that the intention to encourage businesses to move into a 
single jurisdiction and specifically the Federal jurisdiction for awards and collective 
agreements has not been achieved.  Rather, the movement has been towards multiple 
jurisdictions and, in the case of agreements, towards the NSW State jurisdiction.  The 
current proposals to override the State jurisdiction and force workplaces into a single 
Federal system would thus appear to be contrary to the choices currently being made 
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APPENDIX A 
 
COMPARISON OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES IN 
ILLAWARRA - 2004 AND 1996 (% of workplaces) 
 
       Panel Dataset       Total Sample 
VARIABLE       2004    1996        2004   1996 
 
EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS 
Affiliated to Employer Association      59.1  76.4            59        73 
Belong to: 
Illawarra Business Chamber        19.4    n.a.            20  n.a. 
Australian Industry Group        12.9    n.a.            16  n.a. 
Chamber of Commerce        12.9    n.a.              13  n.a. 
Club or Association            5.4    n.a.            19  n.a. 
Other              23.7    n.a.                 6  n.a. 
Services Used: 
Advice on awards or agreements      47.3   66.2    49        60 
Represent in negotiation with unions/employees  25.8   15.1    27        22 
Advice when management negotiate     32.3   22.1    34        20 
Represent in industrial tribunals      33.3   18.3    28        26 
Prepare model contracts / agreements      19.6   10.8    21        15 
Advise on dismissals          40.9   38.7    42        49 
Provision of employment relations training    30.1   20.4    29        25 
Advice on EEO/AA          30.1     9.7    29        16 
Advice on OH&S          38.7   22.6    33        28 
Legal advice            36.6   24.7    35        37 
Other services             8.6    n.a.      7        19 
 
PARTICIAPTION PRACTICES 
Team building           72.0   40.9    72        41 
Semi-autonomous work groups      53.8   28.0    54        34 
TQM              61.3   51.6    58        50 
Quality Circles          58.1   23.7    57        21 
JCC              64.5   32.3    59        28 
Taskforces            38.7   26.9    36        27 
 
UNION PRESENCE 
Trade Union present in workforce      61.3   74.2    51        74 
Average number of unions          1.9     2.3              1.0  1.3 
Delegate present          51.6   52.7    39        47 
Average number of delegates         3.3     2.5              2.7       n.a.   18
Panel Dataset       Total Sample 
VARIABLE       2004    1996        2004   1996  
 
Characteristics of management – union relations: 
Cooperative and positive        50.9              53 
Adversarial and positive          5.3                7 
Adversarial and negative          1.8                2 
Depends on the issue          42.1              38 
Very  good            34.6    44 
Good               53.8    51 
Neither good nor bad                 7.7        5 
Poor                   1.1        1 
Very  poor                  0.0        0 
 
WORKPLACE REDUCTIONS 
Average number of employees terminated for 
reasons other than redundancies         1.3        n.a.            1.6      n.a. 
Reduced workplace in last 12 months     20.4      25.8   22       30 
Reasons for reducing workforce: 
Lack of demand             3.2      12.9   10      14 
Technological change            2.2        1.1     2        0 
Organisational restructuring           8.6        5.4   11       10 
Decrease costs / increase efficiency         1.1        2.2     1         3 
Other                 5.4        3.3     4        2 
Method used to reduce workforce: 
Natural wastage / attrition        10.8       10.8  14       14 
Compulsory reductions / retrenchments      4.3         9.7    6       10 
Voluntary reductions            3.2         4.3    4        6 
Early retirements            1.1         0.0    2        3 
Other                2.2         4.3    2        4 
 
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY 
Experience any industrial activity in last 12 months 19.4       27.0  17      26 
Type of industrial activity: 
Stop work meetings          17.2       27.0  11      23 
Strikes             12.9       13.5    7      18 
Overtime bans             7.5         5.6    4        7 
Work to rule              7.5         0.0    4        4 
Go slow              2.2         0.0    1        3 
Picketing              1.1         2.2    1        3 
Lockouts              0.0         n.a.    0      n.a. 
Other                2.2         4.5    5         7 
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Panel Dataset       Total Sample 
VARIABLE       2004    1996        2004   1996  
 
PAYMENT  SYSTEMS      
Award coverage of employees      95.7    96.6         94         98 
Average number of awards in workplace      2.3      2.4         2.5       n.a.     
Jurisdiction of Awards 
State only            53.8    60.2         51         63 
Federal only            15.1    15.1         15         22 
Both              26.9    17.2         35         13 
Make over award payments        70.8    56.2         76         54 
Certified enterprise agreement in workplace   43.0    43.8         38         41 
Average number of agreements        4.7      3.4         3.5        n.a. 
Jurisdiction of agreements: 
State only            57.5     35.7        21          n.a. 
Federal only            17.5     46.4          8          n.a. 
Both              25.0     17.9          9          n.a. 
Non-certified collective agreement in workplace  25.8     23.7        16           n.a. 
Type: 
AWA                1.1       n.a.        1.4         n.a. 
Verbal agreement            6.5     16.1           5          12 
Other Written           18.3       n.a.         22         n.a. 
 
WORKPLACE CHARACTERISTICS 
Average number of employees: 
Average number full time employees     63.1       n.a.         65.9        n.a. 
Average number part time employees    27.8       n.a.         26.2        n.a. 
Average number of employees in total    90.9     92.0           92  n.a. 
Total employment in these workplaces             8449     8277       19533  n.a. 
Unionised workforce – total members             3642     5433         7601        n.a. 
Average number of unionists       39.2     83.6           35.9        n.a. 
Union density           43.1     65.6            39          65
  
 
Size of firms: 
Small firms - Less than 20 employees    14         0        17          0 
Small medium firms – 20 to 49 employees    30       42        42        64 
Medium firms – 50 – 99 employees      22       23        17         21   
Large medium firms– 100 to 199 employees   18       13        {25      {16 
Large firms – 200 or more employees      9       12        {          { 
      20
Panel Dataset       Total Sample 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLES    2004/1996        2004     1996 
 
Industry Sector 
Mining and manufacturing        22.6            23          15 
Utilities              1.1              1            3 
Construction              6.5                           7            6 
Wholesale trade            5.4                        {20         {19 
Retail trade            10.8                        {             { 
Hospitality              4.3                            4           11 
Transport and storage           5.4                            4             6 
Communications            4.3               2             3 
Finance and insurance           3.2                          {11         {10 
Property and business services      10.8                          {             { 
Government administration and defence      2.2                             2             7 
Education              5.4                             4             8 
Health and community services        8.6                             8             9 
Cultural and personal services        9.7                            15            4 
 
Sector: 
Private             80.6               85           69 
Public             19.4                            15           31 
 
Exporter            20.4                             19          18 
 
 